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,. By letter of 1? February 1983, the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Aftairs requested authorization to draw up a report on the role and functions 
of the International Financial Institutions in the present monetary situation. 
By letter of 25 April 1983, the committee was authorized to report on 
this subject. 
On 25-26 May 1983, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
appointed Mr w. HOPPER as rapporteur. 
At its meetings of 17-19 October, 21-23 November, 29 November and 
20-21 December 1983 the committee considered the draft report and adopted 
it at the latter date by 20 votes in favour to 1 against with 3 
abstentions. 
The following took ~part in t~e vote: Mr Moreau <Chairman), 
Mr Hopper (Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur), Mr Marek <substituting for 
Mr Franz>; Mr Beumer <substituting for Mr Vergeer>; Mr von Bismarck; 
Mr Bonaccini; Mr Caborn; Mr Carossino <substituting for Mr Leonardi>; 
Mr Chanterie <substituting for Mr Van Rompuy); Mr De Goede; Mr Giavazzi; 
Mr Halligan (substituting for Mr Rogers>; Mr Herman; Mr Hutton (substituting 
for Miss Forster); Mr MUller-Hermann; Mme Nikalaou <substituting for 
Mr Schinzel>; Mr Orlandi (substituting for Mr Cingari); Mr Purvis 
<substituting for Mr de Ferranti>; Mr Radoux (substituting for Mr Wagner>; 
Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams; Mr Seal <substituting for Mr Heinemann>; 
Mr Wedekind <substituting for Mr Schnitker>; Mr Welsh and Mr von Wogau. 
The report was tabled on the 4.1.84. 
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A 
------ --- ---- --------- ... 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following Motion for a Resolution together with 
Explanatory Statement 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the role and funct]ons of the International Financial Institutions 
in the present monetary situation 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the report by the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs (Doc. 1-1263/8~, 
A. Recalling that the post World War II financial institutions, as represented 
by the IMF and the World Bank, were entrusted with the task of ensuring a 
coherent and stable international system; 
B. Aware of the growing importance of the BIS in the international finance 
system, in particular since the "Basle Concordat" of 1975; 
c. noting the recent call by the Commonwealth leaders in New Dehli for 
a new Bretton Woods Conference; 
D. Observing, however, that since then dangers have been visible on many 
fronts, such as the reduced control of the IMF over the adjustment 
process due to floating exchange rates and the existence of a large 
uncontrolled Eurocurrency market, the inadequawof the funds of the World 
Bank and the IMF to finance Third World need~ and rising desequilibria 
in LDC's; 
E. Drawing attention to the dramatic increase of sovereign lending by the 
private sector after the first major rise in oil prices at the end of 
1973 when the burden of financial re-cycling was assumed largely by 
commercial banks with whom the bulk of the OPEC surplus was deposited; 
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F. Considering that, as a result of the second oil shock, almost all the non-
oil developing countries have been affected by the combination of high 
real interest rates (including spreads over LIBOR) and of adverse terms 
of trade that resulted from the World recession; 
G. Observing that in the present situation borrowing countries either deflate 
or attempt to increase their indebtedness further with risk of country 
default and potentially snowballing consequences that could endanger 
financial stability and accentuate the world recession; 
H. Considering that the banking industry is inevitably involved in the 
fortunes of its borrowers; 
1. Draws attention to the increase of floating interest debts together with 
the sharp rise intheircos~ which largely explains the major increases 
in interest payments of developing countries in recent years; 
2. Expresses its concern at the risk that some indebted governments may 
prefer the short-term advantage which would result from a default; 
such a default would in fact endanger financial stability and -build up 
fwrther depressionary elements; 
3. Points to the difficulties that default by countries would create for 
commercial banks as regards their own balance sheet~ in this case banks 
acknowledging a capital loss, ought to substantially depreciate their loans; 
4. Is convinced of the need to take action as regards : 
the existing and potential liquidity problems of the borrowers 
(short-term problem>; 
the stability of the world financial system through coordinated 
measures leading to a sustained economic recovery (longer-term question>; 
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5. Is convinced also that the aim should therefore be to maintain a moderate 
level of net new credits to the debtor countries while their adjustment 
process is underway, and then to Limit future recourse to bank credits 
once countries have regained their creditworthiness; 
Debt restructuring and International institutions 
6. Believes that there is no need for new international financial institutions; 
the effort that would be required to create a new institution (1) should 
be directed to the solution of the problems themselves; 
7. Declares its conviction that debt restructuring should be accomplished 
by adopting and widening the role of the existing international financial 
institutions; 
8. Believes that the IMF is already playing a very important role oy 
facilitating the flow of loan~ to the debtor countries and increasing the 
payoff to banks by avoiding default by borrowers; 
9. Suggests in particular that 
once a reasonableprogramme has been agreed between a country and the 
IMF, the creditors should be brought in to satisfy themselves about 
the plan's viability and even to offer suggestions for improvement; 
the IMF should then propose the rescheduling of existing debts 
taking into account not only immediate cash requirements but also 
the projection of earnings and expenditure over a long period of 
time; 
(1) See Peter B. VIENEN "A Bail-out Plan for Banks", New York Times, 6.3.1983 
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10. Suggests also that the IMF's approach be sufficiently flexible in order to 
take into account those poor countries enjoying very Limited access to 
private sector for lending of any kind. It would be suitable, in this 
case, to have both a policy of relatively generous lending to such countries 
under multi-annual programmes and an expansion of the Compensatory 
Financing Facility; 
11. Judges it very important to tighten the IMF's task of surveillance. 
Furthermore, when establishing the recommendation for a loan the IMF 
should pay due attention to reconciling the differing goals of "equal 
treatment" and "tailor made solutions"; 
12. Criticises the extent to which the commercial banks have got involved in 
long-term lending to finance some capital investment and structural deficits 
in the balance of payments by means of short and medium-term loans. 
Such finance, in fact, should be provided by.the World Bank and the 
regional development banks, whose role would have to be increased. 
Also criticises the international monetary authorities and national 
governments for having encouraged commercial banks to become more and 
more involved; 
13. Emphasises the importance of strengthening the World Bank's long term 
lending, which means that the resources at its disposal should be 
increased; 
14. Is aware, in this context, of the proposal by the "Brandt Commission" 
that the gearing ratio of the World Bank should be increased from 1:1 
to 2:1. It is also aware of the serious obstacles in the way of an 
increase of this kin~such as the effect that it could have on the 
World Bank's existing bondholders~ 
In addition, the present ratio 1:1 is somewhat theoretical since only 
7.5% of the capital of the World Bank is actually paid up; 
- 8 - PE 87.989/fin. 
15. Wishes that an increase in the resources available from the World Bank be 
achieved by an increase in the subscribed capital, an increase in the paid-up 
element or a change in the borrowing ratio. Each of the changes would require 
an amendment of World Bank's Articles of Agreement and would therefore take 
years to accomplish. Changes of this kind have little reference to the current 
monetary crisis but they would be useful to assist in Long-term economic 
development in the Third World; 
16. Is firmly convinced that the World Bank should try to achieve greater 
Leveraging of its resources by means of co-financing with commercial banks 
and export financing agencies in industrial nations. It therefore approves 
the Bank's trial programme, adopted early in 1983, more closely Linking the 
finance provided by commercial Lenders with the Bank itself; 
17. Urges the contributing states to agree forthwith an increase in the resources 
of the IDA in order to meet better the needs of the poorest countries and 
calls on the European Community to play a Leading role in convincing the 
USA in particular of the importance of so proceeding. 
~estructuring of private-sector Lending 
18. Stresses the importance of the banking system and World capital market as a 
source of international credit; 
19. Draws attention to the fact that debt crises may create Liquidity crises in 
the banking system; and urges the central banks to clarify their responsibilities 
among themselves in this respect; 
20. Notes with satisfaction the recent improvement in the surveillance procedures 
under the 'Basle Concordat', regrets, however, the Lack of adequate supervision 
of banks in off-shore centres. Believes that a tightening should proceed 
gradually and prudently to avoid the danger of 'competitive non-control' with 
banks gravitating to financial centres where controls or prudential requirements 
are less onerous; 
21. Calls for a Community approach to official discussions on the international 
financial system and the rescheduling of the external debt of countries 1n 
difficulty, especially as regards regions or countries with which EEC's 
relations are particularly close; 
22. Points also to the lack of information. Commercial banks do not appear to have 
~dequate information at their disposal as regards their exposure in particular 
countries, the BIS systems being available for use by banks only after a long 
interval and IMF and World Bank information obtained on a confidential basis and 
therefore not readily available; 
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23. Welcomes, in this context, the setting up in Washington by American, 
European and Japanese banks of an Institute of International Finance 
as an information exchange ~tweenborrowing countries and members of the 
Institute. 
World Economic situation and international monetary issues 
24. Notes that there are some signs of improvement in the world economic 
situation. The economic recovery in the USA, contrary to the expectations 
of most of the American economists, now appears to be established and 
will lead to an increase in export earnings in the Third World countries. 
Furthermore the countries of Eastern Europe have been able to control 
their imports to the extent that they are now running a trade surplus 
with the West. 
Both these developments will reduce international indebtedness and lessen 
the tensions in the international monetary system; 
25. Believes, nonetheless, it would be a great mistake if this improvement 
was used as an excuse for inaction given that the international monetary 
situation remains fragile and that many of the serious problems which 
have affected it in recent years could reoccur. 
26. Welcomes the growing appreciation of the importance of capital flows 
between nations as determinant of trade surpluses, in particular as 
recently exemplified in negotiations between Japan and the USA; 
27. Believes there is no requirement for a New Bretton Woods Conference 
as requested by the Commonwealth leaders in New Dehli if by that is 
meant a conference to redesign the world's financial system; Believes 
also that the existing financial institutions should organise a 
conference or a series of conferences on aspects of existing economic 
systems with a view of improving the workings of the whole system. In 
particular, attention should be paid to the following objectives : 
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to study the events affecting the monetary system in the past 
decade <with a view to learning a lesson from them); 
to decide upon improvement to the role and functioning of the 
existing international financial institutions; 
to coordinate national economic policies at an international 
level in a manner which would parallel the similar coordination 
of national economic policies which is taking place within the 
EEC. 
28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the 
Commission and the Parliaments of the Member States of the Community. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I INTRODUCTION 
1. This report focuses on international financial institutions, in a situation 
where borrowing countries either deflate or attempt to increase 
their indebtedness further. Under these circumstances, the major risk 
is country default with potentially snowballing consequencies that 
could endanger financial stability and accentuate the world recession. 
2. The debt problem in fact is not limited to international loans alone 
but poses a twin threat to the solvency of the Western commercial banking 
system and to the prosperity of the countries that have become heavily 
indebted. Those countries that borrowed to sustain "debt-led growth" 
through the 1970s now find themselves obliged to balance their international 
payments on the basis of the sharply reduced levels of capital inflow 
available to them. Furthermore, the cutback in developing countries imports 
will reduce the exports of the industrial countries. On the other hand, 
the recent aggravation of the sovereign risk problems has occured at a 
time when some of the lending banks are also exposed to unusual risks in 
connection with lending to private sector corporate customers. The banking 
industry is inevitably involved in the fortunes of its borrowers, whether 
they be sovereign states or private sector business. 
The historical background 
3. The post World War II financial institutions, as represented by the IMF 
and the IBRD were entrusted precisely with the task of ensuring a coherent 
and stable international system with generally accepted rules of the 
game. Since then, however, dangers have been visible on many fronts 
the reduced control of the IMF over the adjustment process due to floating 
exchange rates and the existence of a large uncontrolled Eurocurrency 
market, the inadequate funds of the IBRD and the IMF to finance Third World 
needs and rising desequilibria in LDC's. 
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4. In particular, the end of the dollar-standard in August 1971 gave rise to 
currency shifts that led to excessive decline of the dollar. It also 
opened the door to an excessive and volatile reserve expansion which 
escaped international concertation and control. Thereby it has 
contributed to the rise in world inflation and a more irregular financial 
environment. 
5. Sovereign lending by the private sector began dramatically after the 
first major rise in oil prices at the end of 1973, when the Committee of 
Twenty itself urged IMF members to avoid policies that would simply pass 
on the oil deficit to others (1) 
Thereafter there occurred a massive surge in the amount of international 
lending : financial re-cycling was assumed largely by commercial banks, 
whose liquidity was being justified with the bulk of the OPEC surplus. 
6. At that time the recycling of petrodollars via the private sector banks 
was well regarded by everyone : the developing countries for obvious 
reasons; the oil exporting countries, because it gave the OPEC "low 
absorbers" the kind of investment medium which they liked best, namely a 
private sector libaility of a highly liquid nature; the industrialised 
countries which appreciated seeing somebody running corresponding deficits 
vis-a-vis OPEC countries running large surpluses on current account. 
7. The second oil shock, and the decision of the major industrial countries 
to prevent that shock being translated into a new upward step in the 
inflation rate, led to a severe world recession and a drastic worsening 
in the external position of the developing countries : monetary restrai~t 
as the principal weapon of anti-inflationary policy, together with Lax 
U.S. fiscal policy, led to the very high nominal and real interest rates 
on the floating rate debt that predominates in international borrowing; 
tight monetary policies curtailed the loanable funds available to the 
(1) See "International Monetary Reform 
Twenty, Washington, IMF, 1974. 
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8. 
banks and thus brought into question the continued expansion of international 
lending. Almost all the non-oil developing countries have been affected 
by the combination of high real interest rates (including spreads over 
LIBOR> and adverse terms of trade that resulted from the world recession. 
The decline in the growth of export earning combined with the attempt to 
minimise the impact on domestic absorption has led to a sharp increase 
in bank borrowing. In 1981 net lending to non-OPEC LDCs by BIS reporting 
banks increased by 20% and that by US banks by 24% (1). In 1982, banks 
assessment of the risks involved in lending to developing countries has 
become much more pessimistic. Furthermore, the concentration of commercial 
bank lending on a few fast growing NICs ' 2' and Eastern European countries 
increases, of course, the vulnerability of banks to any adverse developments 
in these countries. Net lending to developing countries has therefore 
been declining sharply in 1982. 
In 1983 the IMF Managing Director has predicted that international bank 
exposure will increase by only a nominal 8% even after the $5 billion 
loan to Mexico is taken into account. 
Present Situation 
9. It appears in retrospect that certain developing countries have borrowed 
unwisely using some of the resources to finance consumption and investments 
of dubious value rather than to strengthen their productive potential. 
It is also worth recalling the mismatch between the long-term horizon of 
tht? l:,;,:·~~rn~n\ t~~il'\~ JPdHh~~•'\ ~11.;,~ n~c .'"E·.~~\.jt~~tt!·~ ;,;··.,~ -~•tc.., \e"'y s~ort­
term maturity of the debt contracted to finance the investment. 
(1) See "World Financial Markets", Morgan Guaranty Trust Group, 
New York, October 1982 
<2> Argentin~, Brazil, South Korea and Mexico account for more than half 
of the total outstanding loans of private banks to non-OPEC LDCs, for 
some 85% of the net floating debt and almost all of total net private 
banks exposure to such countries. 
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<1) Furhtermore, the increase in the volume of floating-interest debts, 
together with the sharp use in its cost, largely explains the major increases 
in interest payments of developing countries in recent years. On the other 
hand, overeagerness by banks to lend has sometimes allowed borrowing 
governments to delay necessary adjustments. 
10. The major problem to be faced at the present time is, whether and to what 
extent financial institutions operating in an international context can 
be expected to meet future credit demands of developing countries. It is 
necessary here to remember that "insolvency'~ by borrowing countries 
can stem from both a temporary shortage of foreign exchange - liquidity 
problem - and a long-term incapcity to service debt-insolvency problem 
for which there are only two solutions : default or adjustment. 
The ·essential question is, whether short-run current account deficits of 
LDCs and Eastern European countries are compatible with long-term 
"fundamentals", that is whether borrowers can be expected to earn enough 
foreign exchange to pay interest costs over the long run • In fact if 
the borrower's ability to pay interest over the long run is put into 
question deflation of domestic demand becomes necessary. 
11. The risk is that some indebted governments may prefer the short-term gains 
from defaulting; and temptation to default is Likely to increase when 
precedences are established or when a country does not act in isolation. 
As already stat~before, the fact of LDCs becoming insolvent, now and in 
the future, could have snowballing effects, endangering financial stability 
and building up further depressionary elements. As far as the commercial 
banks are concerned, country default would create difficulties for their 
own balance sheets. In this case banks, acknowledging a capital loss, 
ought to depreciate substantially th~ir loans. 
(1) Between 1977 and 1982 annual nominal interest costs of developing 
countries rose sharply from 7.8 to 17.5% 
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Action is therefore to be taken as regards 
Ca) the existing and potential liquidity problems of the 
borrowers <short-term problem); 
(b) the stability of the world financial system through the 
definition of coordinated measures leading to a sustained economic 
recovery <longer-term question). 
Debt restructuring and International--institutions 
--------- --· --· .. - -----------
12. Lending by commercial banking is an inappropriate way to financ~ economic 
development, since the terms offered cannot match all the terms needed. 
Furthermore bankers may not be willing to financing borrowers suffering from 
lack of liquidity: they could be reluctant to provide unconditional 
support for borrowing countries <whose expenditures are not consistent 
anymore with present world demand conditions and relative prices) unless 
a stabilisation programme is first put into place. On the other hand, 
any precipitate reduction in Lending would impose intolerable strains on 
the debtor countries: fast adjustment by the debtor nations would further 
depress international demand and prolong the slump. 
13. The aim should therefore be to maintain a moderate level of net new 
credits to the debtor countries while the adjustmentprocess is under way, 
2nd then to limit future recourse to bank credits once countries have 
regained their creditworthiness. The achievement of this aim can only be 
poss1ble through coo~eration. 
14_ There have been suggestions that debt restructuring should be accomplished by 
creating a new institution <a sort of & subsidiary of the World Bank or InF) charged 
with acting as a new intermediary between the banks and the develcping countries. 
This ~nstitution woula acquire the claims of the commercial banks and 
~escheduLe them on a once-off long term loan with some modest measures 
of debt relief (1). ~evertheless, the way this new institute would have 
to work would still n~ed further improvemen~s. It seems preferable to 
increase the role of the existing international financial institutions. 
<1) ~j,!e Pt ter- B. Kenen "A Bai I.-out Plan for Banks", New York Time~ 
6 March 1983 
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15. The IMF is now playing a crucially important role by facilitating the 
flow of loans to the debtor country and increasing the payoff to banks 
by avoiding borrowers default. 
Actually debt restructuring must be negotiated between debtor and creditors 
and such an exercise will continue to require a lead from the IMF, involving 
its own financial participation, its certification of an adjustment 
programme and its organisation of support from commercial banks : 
once a reasonable programme has been agreed between a country and the IMF 
the creditors should be brought in to satisfy themselves about the plan's 
viability and even to offer suggestions for improvement. The IMF should 
then propose the rescheduling of existing debts by taking into account 
not only immediate cash requirements but also the projection of earning 
and expenditure over a long period of time. 
16. In addition, the IMF's approach should be sufficiently flexible in order to 
take into account the fact that its clientele also includes a large number 
of poor countries enjoying very limited access to the private sector of any 
kind. 
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A policy of relatively generous lending to such countries under multi-
annual programmes might then be suitable. The same applies to the need 
for an expansion of the Compensatory Financing Facility. 
Furthermore, when establishing the Fund's recommendation for a loan 
<which is primarily the responibilities of its Exchange and Trade Relations 
Department) attention should be paid to reconciling the differing goals of 
"equal treatment" and "tailor made solutions". 
17. The extent to which the commercial banks get involved in long-term 
lending to finance capital investment is certainly to be criticised. 
Such finance, in fact, should be provided in a securer form,which means 
that for this purpose, the role of the World Bank and the regional 
development banks would have to be increased. 
In order to make it possible for the World Bank to strengthen its Lon~ term 
lending activities the resources at its disposal should be increased. 
18. The World Bank could increase its lending capacity by altering its gearing 
ratio <the ratio of exposure outstanding to total capital, including 
callable and paid-in capital). In fact, the World Bank's Charter!·sets 
out an extremely conser~ative 1:1 ratio to tot~capital (1) Raising 
its gearing ratio would permit the World Bank to borrow more from the 
market without having to ask for new loans by its Member States. The 
Independent Commission on International Development Issues (the Brandt 
Commission) recommended in its 1980 report that there be a gradual expansion of 
the gearing ratio,rising slowly to a still conservative 2:1. 
19. Such an increase seems to be very difficult to achieve given the 
effect it could have on the World Bank's existing bondholders. 
(1) Commercial banks may risk anexposure of 25:1 or more of their 
capital base. 
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In fact, the investors who currently have Lent the bank about $40 billion 
have done so relying on the virtual total protection of that 1:1 ratio. 
In addition, this ratio is somewhat theoretical since only 7.5% of the 
capital of the World Bank is actually paid up. Furthermore a change in the 
borrowing ratio, an increase in the subscribed capital or an increase in 
the paid-up element would require an amendment of the World Bank's Articles of 
Agreement and would therefore take years to accomplish. 
20. An increasingly important means of channelling a sufficient amount of new 
capital to the developing countries are certainly the co-financing 
arrangements between the World Bank and government and private lenders. In 
fact, although co-financing is not a new activity for the World Bank - such 
arrangements were initiated in 1974 - it has assumed greater importance 
in view of the uncertainty of adequate capital flows to the developing 
countries needed to assist them in their adjustment efforts. Actually, 
about one third of the present development projects assisted by the World 
Bank receive financial support from a cofinancer. {1) Furthermore, early 
in 1983, the World Bank approved a trial programme more closely Linking 
the finance provided by commercial Lenders with the Bank. The main 
feature of this programme are that the World Bank, in addition to making 
its own Loan for an investment, may participate in the para~lel commercial 
loan. 
Restructuring of private-sector Lending 
21. It is quite important that the restructuring of public sector lending should 
proceed in line with that of bank lending. In fact, while the IMF and 
World Bank may be able to further expand their own Lending, they cannot 
(1) Between financial years 1972 and 1983, the total cost of projects 
supported by the Bank totalled $275 billion, with about half of this 
sum obtained from other lenders. 
(2) This participation may take the form of direct financial participation 
in the later maturities of a loan made by commercial banks, the use of 
a World,Bank Guarantee, or a contingent participation by the World 
Bank in the commercial loan. 
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be expected to assume a primary role as a source of credit, replacing 
the banking system and World capital markets. 
22. This raises two related issues. Debt crises may create a Liquidity 
crises in the banking system. 
23. The first is the Lack of bank supervisors. This Lack is particularly 
serious for the international financial system, especially bearing in 
mind the concentration of highly Leveraged financial intermediaries 
in off-shore centres. Prudential requirements and surveillance in such 
areas as capital adequacy should be increased. This tightening should, 
however proceed gradually and prudently because there is a danger of 
'competitive non-control' with banks gravitating to financial centres 
where controls or prudential requirements are less onerous. 
24. The second is the lack of information. Data on international indebtedness 
on a systematic basis might in some cases have alerted the commercial banks 
more quickly to the gravity of their present problems. The BIS systems 
are the only ones which provide information on international bank lending 
but they become available for use by banks only after a long interval. 
Furthermore, commercial banks do not appear ,to have adequate information 
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at their disposal as regards their exposure in particular countries : 
information held in the IMF and World Bank on the economies of individual 
countries is not readily available to commercial banks since much of it 
is obtained on a confidential basis from member countries. In this 
context the setting up in Washington, by American, European and Japanese 
banks, of an Institute of International Finance as an information exchange 
between borrowing countries and members of the Institute is worthy of 
particular note. 
World economic situation and international monetary issues 
25. The major threat to successful resolution of the debt crisis lies in the 
possibility ot.1 an adequate global recovery failing to materialise. 
The current developments, however, seem to indicate a certain 
improvement. 
26. The u.s. economic recovery now appears to be established (1) and will 
lead to an increase in export earni~in the Third World countries. The 
countries of Eastern Europe have been able to control their imports to 
the extent that they are running a trade surplus with the West. Both these 
developments will reduce international indebtedness and lessen the tensions 
in the international monetary system. Nonetheless, it would be a great 
mistake if these signs of improvement were used as an excuse for 
inaction : the international monetary situation, in fact, remains very 
fragile and uncertain. 
27. Action is certainly to be taken as regards international monetary issues. 
In this context, particular attention should be paid to the preparation 
of a new B~tton Woods Conference with the following objectives : 
(1) In 1983 the GNP is estimated by the u.s. Department of Commerce to have 
grown at an annual rate of 7.9% in real terms in the third quarter, 
following increases of 9.7% in the second quarter and 2.6% in the first quar'er. 
PE 87.989/fin. 
- 21 -
to study the events affecting the monetary system in the past decade 
<with a view to learning a lesson from them>; 
to decide upon alternatives to the role and functioning of the 
existing international financial institutions; 
to coordinate national economic policies at an international level 
in a manner which would parallel the similar coordination of 
national economic policies which is taking place within the EEC; 
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